PresentationAccessLEEM's publications
The observation of naturally occuring events does not allow a careful isolation of the relevant factors that affect those events, nor to measure precisely their relative importance. Furthermore, some situations are hardly observable, either because they correspond to very rare events in space and time, or because they require a particular combination of factors. Finally, some economic situations cannot be observed without the practical implementation of some policy instrument. Experimental tools have been developed by economists, in order to overcome some of the difficulties of observing naturally occurring events.In a typical experiment, an artificial environment is created, reflecting either the conditions described by economic theory or some hypothetical situation. Therefore economic experiments can be designed to address three types of issues:
- theory testing, by providing relevant data,
- decision aid, by evaluating the impact of various instruments (e.g. a public policy or a firm strategy), without exposing the individuals or groups concerned by those instruments to the potential costs or risks of a real in-situ implementation,
- provide new insights and knowledge about situations for which theory is lacking or incomplete.
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- Frequently Asked Questions about Experimental Economics
- Smith, V., 1994. “Economics in the Laboratory”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8(1), 113-131
- Smith, V., 1982. “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science”. American Economic Review 72(5), 923-955
Room 216 (2nd floor)
Faculté des Sciences Economiques
Espace Richter – Avenue de la Mer
CS 79606
34960 MONTPELLIER cedex 2
E-mail: leem-contact@umontpellier.fr
Tramway: line 1, line 3 or line 4
Get off at Rives du Lez and cross over the gate above the Lez.
Partial connectivity increases cultural accumulation within groups
Derex, M. and Boyd R.
2016
Proceedings of the National Academy of SciencesEvidence of genotypic adaptation to the exposure to volcanic risk at the dopamine receptor DRD4 locus
Faurie, C., Mettling, C., Bchir, M.A., Sri Hadmoko, D., Heitz, C., Dwi Lestari, E, Raymond, M. and Willinger, M.
2016Nature - Scientific ReportsHow do incidental emotions impact pro-environmental behavior? Evidence from the dictator game
Ibanez, L., Moureau, N., and Roussel, S.
2016Journal of Behavioral and Experimental EconomicsWho are the Voluntary Leaders? Experimental Evidence from a Sequential Contribution Game
Preget, R., Nguyen Van, P. and Willinger, M.
2016Theory and DecisionMalevolent Governance, Intra-Group Conflict and the Paradox of the Plenty: An Experiment
Puzon, K. and Willinger, M.
2016GamesThe perils of government enforcement
Romaniuc, R., Farrow, K., Marciano, A., and Ibanez, L.
2016Public ChoiceMen increase contributions to a public good when under sexual competition
Tognetti, A., , Faurie, C. and Willinger, M.
2016Nature - Scientific ReportsSocial learning and the replication process: an experimental investigation
Derex, M., Feron, R., Godelle, B., and Raymond M
2015Proceedings of the Royal Society BChoice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism?
Figuières, C., Midler, E. and Willinger, M.
2015Social Choice and WelfareThe trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment
Figuières, C., Rouaix, A. and Willinger, M.
2015Social Choice and WelfarePerformance of the ambient tax: does the nature of the damage matter?
Ammar, N., Ennasri, A. and Willinger, M.
2014Environmental and Resource EconomicsHow does competition affect the transmission of information?
Derex M., Godelle B. and Raymond M.
2014Evolution and Human BehaviorIncentives and managerial effort under competitive pressure: An experiment
Ennasri, A. and Willinger, M.
2014Research in EconomicsInfluence of context on player behavior: Experimental assessment
Farolfi, S., Désolé, M. and Rio, P
2014Simulation and GamingSharing rules for a Common-Pool Resource with private alternatives
Lefebvre, M., Tidball, M., Thoyer, S. and Willinger, M.
2014Environmental Modelling and AssessmentWhen Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the common ratio effect
Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
2014Journal of Risk and UncertaintyExperimental evidence for the influence of group size on cultural complexity
Derex M., Beugin M.P., Godelle B. and Raymond M.
2013NatureDoes a membership fee foster successful public good provision? An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good?
Bchir, M.A.
2013Public ChoiceWeak moral motivation leads to the decline of voluntary contributions
Figuières, C., Masclet, D. and Willinger, M.
2013Journal of Public Economic TheoryIncome redistribution and public good provision : an experiment
Maurice, J., Rouaix, A. and Willinger, M.
2013International Economic ReviewOptimization incentives and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games
Dubois, D., Willinger, M. and Nguyen Van, P.
2012International Journal of Game TheoryDoes identification affect trust and reciprocity in the lab?
Dubois, D., Willinger, M. and Blayac, T.
2012Journal of Economic PsychologyVanishing leadership and declining reciprocity in a sequential contribution experiment
Figuières, C., Masclet, D. and Willinger, M.
2012Economic InquiryDo static externalities offset dynamic externalities? An experimental study of the exploitation of substitutable common-pool resources
Giordana, G., Montginoul, M. and Willinger, M.
2010Agricultural and Resource Economics ReviewDo binding agreements solve the social dilemma?
Thoron, S., Sol, E. and Willinger, M.
2009Journal of Public EconomicsTolérance de la fraude et évasion fiscale: une analyse expérimentale du modèle de Greenberg
Bchir, M.A., Daures, N. and Willinger, M.
2008Economie et prévisionRisque et sélection d'équilibre dans un jeu de coordination: une analyse expérimentale
Dubois, D., Willinger, M. and Nguyen Van, P.
2007Annales d'Economie et de Statistiques
Experimental economics in Montpellier
Researchers, faculty and doctoral students in economics study individual and group behaviour in various economic environments. They are involved in national and international research projects.
The research team relies strongly on laboratory experimentation to carry out those projetcs. For running experiments we need volunteers which are paid for their participation in experimental sessions. The payment rules differ according to the type of experiment. However, on average participants earn between 5 and 25 Euros for a typical session (about 1:30 mn duration).
No knowledge in economics is required to participate in our experiments. Everybody can apply to become a participant.
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